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The impact of (petty) corruption on firm innovation in Vietnam1 
 
Nguyen Ngoc Anh   Doan Quang Hung   Nguyen Ngoc Minh  Binh Tran-Nam 
 
Abstract:  Corruption has been found to have complex effects on firm innovation. Limited 
theoretical and empirical evidence to date has been rather inconclusive. The literature suggets 
that corruption could have a negative or positive impact on innovation and, in some cases, 
both of these effects can exist simultaneously. This article employes established econometric 
estimation techniques and Vietnam’s small and medium manufacturing enterprise data to 
quantitatively analyze the impact of petty corruption on firm innovation in Vietnam. The 
empirical results obtained tend to support the greasing hypothesis of corruption on innivation.  
More specifically, informal payments by Vietnam firms are shown to encourage overall 
innovation, product improvement innovation and new innovation.  This is not entirely 
unexpected, in view of other findings reported in this special issue, and in view of the 
business practice of paying small informal fees to speed up transactions with the public sector 
in Vietnam.  However, the findings also strongly implies that in the fight against corruption it 
is critically important to highlight (to firms) the true costs of corruption in the long run. 
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Introduction 
 
This article is part of a series of related studies on the costs of corruption in Vietnam, which 
have been funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) Vietnam and 
managed by Coffey International. The principal aim of this research is to analyze quantitatively 
the effects of corruption on firm innovation activities in Vietnam. In so doing, the article 
intends to make a contribution to the relatively small body of international and national 
literature on the relationship between corruption and innovation. The research approach is 
quantitative, utilizing established econometric techniques with the best data currently available 
from Vietnam. Nevertheless, due to data availability, the scope of this article is restricted to 
petty corruption and to small and medium manufacturing enterprises in the private sector in 
Vietnam. 
Before proceeding, it may be useful to make some brief remarks concerning innovation and 
corruption. Innovation is widely regarded as a key driver of increased productivity worldwide, 
especially in view of the new growth theory ([1], [2], [3]). In this sense, innovation can also be 
viewed as an important channel for economic growth. Different types of innovation in the 
production and distribution process have been identified in the literature, including, for 
example, process innovation, product innovation, organizational innovation and marketing 
innovation ([4], [5]). We will draw from these distinctions for our own analysis, as elaborated 
later in this article. 
Corruption refers to the abuse of public office by civil servants or officials for illegitimate 
private gains [6]. In country-level empirical studies, corruption is often measured by some kind 
of summary indexes (e.g., Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index or the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) while at firm level, the focus is on bribery 
behaviors. Some authors (see, for example, [7]) further classify corruption by scale (grand vs. 
petty). It has been argued that firms engage in grand corruption to gain market advantages (e.g. 
to win a government’s procurement contract) and in petty corruption to ‘get things done’ (e.g. 
to speed up business applications). While the grand corruption, often associated with high-level 
public officials is generally seen as detrimental harmful for a long term viable economy ([8], 
[9], [10], [11]; see also Nguyen et al [12] in this issue], the impact of petty corruption, often 
associated a small amount of money and low level of public officers, can be positive in certain 
situations of defective institutions by speeding up and improving the quality of public services, 
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i.e. in a ‘second best world’, aka the so-called ‘greasing the wheels hypothesis’ (see, for 
example, [13], [14] Huntington, 1968 [15]). Empirical evidence of  positive impact of  
corruption at the country level can be found in Méon and Weill [16] and at state level for India 
could be found in Kato and Sato [17] where corruption ‘greases the wheels’ of productivity or 
growth. 
The impact of petty corruption is often studied using firm/plant level data. Overall the 
literature shows that the impact of corruption is not uniform and depends on the effectiveness 
of local institutions. While there is evidence of negative impact of corruption on performance 
of firms (see, for example, [18]), at the micro (firm/plant) level, Dreher and Gassebner [19] 
provide evidence that corruption may temper the negative effect of regulation on early-stage 
entrepreneurship. Zhou and Peng [20] find that bribery hurts growth for small and medium-
size firms but not for large firms due to the fact that large firms may choose to engage in bribery 
strategically while smaller firms are forced to do so. Chen et al [21] report that bribery helps 
private firms to access bank credit in China. Interestingly, an empirical microanalysis of 
Indonesian firms by Vial and Hanoteau [22] demonstrates the co-existence of negative and 
positive impacts of corruption in the sense that at plant level there is evidence of the ‘grease 
the wheel’ effect, i.e. plants offering bribes enjoy higher productivity growth, corruption 
remains harmful at the aggregated level of manufacturing industries.  
In this article, we contribute to the above empirical literature by estimating the impact of 
petty corruption on an important factor of growth, namely, the innovation activities of firms. 
In a country like Vietnam where competitiveness of the private sector is hampered by 
beaurocratic administrative burden and the existence of low-pay public sector, the ‘sensible 
strategy’ for firms would be to pay a small informal payment for speeding up transactions with 
the government.2 The article makes use of the small and medium enterprise (SME) survey data 
conducted biennially since 2005 by the Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) 
and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Our empirical analysis suggests 
that bibery in the form of informal payment by Vietnamese SMEs grease the wheel of the 
beaurocratic machinery. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a succinct 
summary of theoretical arguments concerning the possible effects of corruption on innovation. 
                                                        
2 The high cost of tax compliance in term of time has been highlited, for example http://baobaohiemxahoi.vn/vi/tin-
chi-tiet-thu-tuong-chinh-phu-chi-dao-ve-cai-cach-thu-tuc-hanh-chinh-thue-bhxh-a7d518cb.aspx  
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This is basically a review of the sand vs. grease the wheel hypotheses as applied to innovation. 
This theoretical discussion is followed by a  review of the evidence from empirical studies, 
focusing on definitions of key variables, data sources, estimating methods and key findings. 
The research methodology and the dataset employed in the present study are discussed next. 
This is then followed by the findings of the present study, which confirm that corruption has a 
greasing impact on different types of firm innovation in Vietnam. The final section concludes.  
 
Review of theoretical models 
 
The literature on the theoretical relationship between corruption and innovation is meager in 
terms of number of studies and indeterminate in terms of findings. There is a paucity of 
theoretical studies on how corruption affects innovation, although there is of course a related 
and much more substantial strand of literature relating to corruption and economic 
efficiency/growth. The competing sand-the-wheels and grease-the-wheels hypotheses 
concerning the impact of corruption and economic growth apply equally well in the case of 
corruption and innovation.  That is, these hypotheses can be modified to provide arguments on 
how corruption ‘sands’ or ‘greases’ innovation.  
The sand-the-wheels hypothesis is the formal statement of the common-sense observation 
that corruption, however defined, is detrimental to innovation and economic development. This 
is basically how international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
perceive corruption, culminating in international initiatives such as the United Nations (UN) 
Convention against Corruption [23] or the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions [24]. 
Various theoretical arguments have been put forward in the literature to support the above 
orthodox viewpoint. Myrdal [25] suggested that corrupt public servants may cause unnecessary 
delays to extract a bribe. Such delays tend to harm innovative efforts. Likewise, Veracierto 
[26] constructed a game theoretic model that demonstrates a positive effect of corruption 
controls on production innovation, although his model does not shed light on the precise 
channel of this positive effect. As pointed out by Rose-Ackerman [27], although corruption 
and competitive auction are analogous, the highest briber may also be the one who is most 
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willing to compromise on the quality of the goods produced once a license is obtained. It is 
also quite possible that corruption may divert entrepreneurial efforts away from factor of 
production coordination activities such as innovation into dealing with bureaucracies as 
suggested by Bó and Rossi [28]. In this case, corruption may reduce rather than increase the 
incentive to innovate.  
Corruption has also been argued to increase uncertainty and transaction costs and thus make 
a potentially promising innovative opportunity much less attractive commercially (see, for 
example, Luo [29]. It has also been suggested that innovative activities may be adversely 
affected by corruption due to lack of resources (from investment) or lack of trust in institutions 
([5]: 81). Shleifer & Vishny [30] also argue in a similar fashion that the true level of innovation 
may get inflated in the presence of corruption. This is because corrupt firms would often report 
as having advanced technologies, even though they are not necessarily needed. 
Corruption may also act as a barrier to innovation through various indirect channels. For 
example, Murphy et al [31] argue that, due to the economic benefits of corruption to some 
individuals, economic agents are likely to move from productive to unproductive rent-seeking 
activities. Such a sub-optimal reallocation would harm human capital accumulation and 
consequently innovation. Along a similar line, Kurer [32] contends that corrupt officials have 
an incentive to create distortions in the economy to protect their illegal income. Such 
distortions may hinder innovation. Further, corruption in a host country may also have a 
negative impact on the inflow of foreign direct investment, which is a well-known source of 
technology transfer for the host country. Additionally, corrupt practice by foreign firms may 
also potentially retard the host country’s innovative activity [7]. 
The grease-the-wheels hypothesis represents the alternative viewpoint. According to this line 
of thinking, advanced by Leff [13] and Leys [14], corruption can be efficiency- or innovation-
enhancing. This is so because corruption may alleviate the distortions in an economy caused 
by ill-functioning institutions or poor governance structure. An important bureaucratic 
inefficiency that can be compensated for through corruption is time losses in legally 
establishing new firms [14]. This idea has been supported by Lui [33] who demonstrates in a 
formal model that corruption could reduce time spent in a queue. Another important 
bureaucratic inefficiency is caused by the government’s inability to attract quality public 
servants. In this context, it has been argued by Leys [14] and Bailey [34] that corruption can 
improve the quality of public servants when government salaries are low.  A similar argument 
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offered by Leff [13] is that the most generous briber can also be the most efficient producer. 
Subsequently, Lien [35], and Beck and Maher [36] formally demonstrate that corruption can 
duplicate the outcome of a competitive auction aimed at assigning government procurement 
contract. In this sense, corruption can stimulate innovation by assigning the projects to the most 
efficient firms. 
Opponents of the efficiency- or innovation-enhancing schools of thought have argued that 
the positive impact of corruption is based on weak and unjustifiable assumptions. For instance, 
the size of the bribe may be determined by corrupt officials rather than by corrupt firms. 
Similarly, corrupt bureaucrats are most unlikely to work to promote economic growth or 
innovation. Against Leff’s argument [13], Tanzi [37] claims that the rigidities are not the nature 
of the society, but created by the government officials, especially if such obstacles can attract 
more bribes. Consequently, it is unreasonable to claim that corruption can enhance efficiency 
or innovation by removing these rigidities.  Myrdal [25] also states that in case of corruption, 
rather than accelerating the administrative procedure, officials would maintain the rigidities in 
order to receive more bribes. Kaufmann and Wei [38] support this view, arguing that since 
bureaucrats can endogenously choose regulatory burdens and delays, they tend to extract the 
largest amount of corruption. Thus, firms are likely to spend more time in negotiating with 
corrupt officials, leading to higher costs of capital. 
In contrast to Beck and Mahers’ claim [36], firms which pay the highest bribe may not 
necessarily be the most economically efficient ones. The firm which offers the highest bribe 
may simply do so because they consider bribe as an investment with a high rate of return [23].  
Further, a later study of Acemoglu & Verdier [39] suggests that property rights enforcement, 
which is decided by public officials, is the key condition for wealth creation.  Firms need to 
get it to resolve environmental problems by internalizing externalities and relying on incentives 
of private owners to conserve resources for the future; it would be difficult and costly for firm 
if public officials require bribes to complete the administration process. Consequently, it is 
necessary to prevent all corruption. 
In summary, there are different ways to view the theoretical impact of corruption on 
innovation, particularly in countries with weak governance structure and institutions. Thus, it 
is necessary to turn to empirical studies to resolve this difference. It is important to note that it 
is conceivable for both hypotheses to hold simultaneously. A more recent and perhaps more 
plausible approach is to disaggregate corruption into different types which may in turn have 
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opposite effects on different types of innovation. This approach will be further considered 
below. 
 
Review of empirical studies 
 
There are very few empirical studies that directly examine corruption as a determinant of 
innovation at either firm or national levels. The available evidence, however  shows no 
consensus on the effects of corruption on innovation. Broadly speaking, empirical studies 
relating innovation to corruption can be classified into two groups by reference to the level of 
aggregation of data. The first group utilizes data at the country level whereas the second group 
employs firm-level data. Most of studies using aggregate data at the national level find that 
corruption negatively affects innovation.  
In a study of the socioeconomic determinants of innovation, Griffiths and Kickul [40] 
classify several EU countries, Japan and the US into four groups (leaders, followers, trailing 
and catching up) on the basis of each country’s innovation index. Using data from Eurostat 
2006 and supplemented with Transparency International’s 2005 CPI within a multivariate 
discriminant analysis framework, the authors report a positive relationship between the two 
variables, i.e. more/less innovative countries have higher/lower CPI (less/more corruption). 
This finding has also been confirmed by Golla [41] in her study of the simple correlation 
between CPI and Summary Innovation Index (SII) in formerly centrally planned EU economies 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria 
and Romania) for the year 2009.  
In a study similar in spirit to that of Griffiths and Kickul [40], Natário et al [42] set out to 
test, among other things, the hypothesis that institutional efficiency has a positive influence on 
a country’s innovative capacity. Using a cluster analysis with data derived from the European 
Innovation Scoreboard for 2008, Natário et al [42] show a strong association between 
corruption and innovation. The first cluster of countries including Australia, Germany, Estonia 
and Luxemburg that has the greatest innovative capacity is associated with the highest level of 
corruption control, whereas the third cluster including Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia that has the least innovative capacity is associated with 
the lowest level of control of corruption.  
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Anokhin & Schulze [43] draw on longtitudinal data covering 64 countries from 1996 to 
2002 to test the hypothesis that improvement in corruption control raises the level of innovation 
at a decreasing rate. Using random-effects negative binomial regression where innovation was 
defined as the number of patent applications, the linear effect of control of corruption on 
innovation was not significant but the squared-term effect was significantly positive, implying 
a convex relationship between innovation and corruption.  
On the other hand, at the firm level, there is evidence of both sanding and greasing. A recent 
study by de Waldemar [44] finds strong evidence to support the sand the wheels hypothesis. 
The data for this study is derived from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Indian firms in 
2005, consisting of 2,280 enterprises located in 17 states in all regions of the country. The key 
variables are product innovation (whether a new product has been introduced) and bribery 
(sector-sate average of firms’ responses). Using probit estimation, bribery is shown to have a 
negative and significant effect in all specifications.  The results are robust in terms of both the 
endogeneity test (via the use of instrumental probit estimation) and the introduction of a multi-
product dummy variable, providing the evidence that corruption in the form of bribery 
diminishes the probability of new products being introduced by Indian firms. 
A relatively recent study using firm-level data is that of Mahagaonkar [5]. This study 
focuses on African countries which are often considered to have weak governance structures 
and burdensome regulations, making them suitable test-cases for the sand/grease the wheels 
hypotheses. An interesting feature of this study is the recognition of four separate types of 
innovation: process, product, organizational and marketing innovation. This separation is 
important because innovative activities that require exclusively the use of public properties 
such as licenses or permits may be impacted differently by corruption. Using the probit and 
instrumental variable probit models with the African subset of a large-scale firm-level data set 
derived from the 2004 World Bank Enterprise Survey, it is found that corruption impedes 
product and organizational innovation but has a beneficial effect on marketing innovation. 
Process innovation appears to be unaffected by corruption. The findings of this study lend 
support to the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of the sand/grease the wheels hypotheses.  
There is evidence showing a positive greasing relationship between corruption and 
innovation. Krammer [45] employs data from 7,000 firms in 30 emerging markets to examine 
the impact of corruption, proxied by bribes, on firm innovation. Despite significant 
heterogeneity in terms of both bribing practices and innovative performance, the study shows 
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that bribes have a positive effect on firm innovation by greasing the regulatory apparatus to 
facilitate the introduction of innovative products to markets but local arbitrariness in corruption 
practices defined as the dispersion of individual firm bribes within a sector-region-city unit, 
has a negative impact on firm innovation. More interstingly, the study also reports that the 
efficiency of bribes is mitigated by the quality of formal (control of corruption) and informal 
institutions.  
The harmful effect of corruption on innovation can also arise from foreign firms’ practice 
in host countries. Habiyaremye and Raymond [7] examine transnational corruption and 
innovation in transition countries using data derived from the fourth wave of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – World Bank Business Environment and 
Enterprise Survey, which relies on information for the year 2007 from about 12,000 firms in 
30 countries in Eastern Europe and Central and Western Asia. Three  measures of innovation 
are employed, namely, innovation effort (R&D spending), incremental innovation (upgrading 
of existing goods/services), and major innovation (introduction of new goods/services). 
Similarly four measures of corruption are utilized, namely, the percentages of firms in each 
two-digit industry, taken separately for each country, that engage in grand and petty corruption, 
which are further broken down into foreign and domestic firms. The authors find that: (i) grand 
corruption by foreign firms is detrimental to all types of innovation while grand corruption by 
domestic firms have no effect on the three innovation measures, (ii) petty corruption by local 
firms has a stifling effect on innovation effort and incremental innovation, but not major 
innovation, while petty corruption by foreign firms has a positive direct effect on major 
innovation (evidence of a wheel greasing effect), (iii) the combination of grand corruption by 
foreign firms and petty corruption by domestic firms causes the most harm to innovation.  
Another useful reference for the present study is a recent paper by Rand and Tarp [46]. 
Although this study does not examine the relationship between corruption and innovation, it 
utilizes the same panel data set that will also be employed in the present study. Rand and Tarp 
[46] examine the determinants of bribes and changes in bribe-paying behavior in Vietnam in 
2005 and 2007. Employing a pooled probit model and a fixed-effects linear probability model, 
bribe incidence was found to be significantly positively related to firm’s size, firm’s 
willingness to pay (proxied by profit per employee) and firm’s outside options (proxied by 
capital/labor ratio). Conversely, bribe incidence was negatively associated to a time dummy 
variable. Other explanatory variables such as receipt of government assistance, international 
trade and business registration are also found to be statistically significant.  
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Although the literature on corruption and innovation is only emerging recently as reviewed 
above, the currently available evidence tends to suggest that the connection between innovation 
and corruption is complex with possible two-way causality and the impact of corruption on 
innovation may be depedent upon types of innovation, types of corruption and the local 
institution. In the following section of our article, we attempt to deal with the possible 
endogeneity between corruption and innovation and at the same time explore the impacts of 
corruption on different types of innovation, namely production innovation, process innovation 
and product improvement.  
 
Research approach and data description 
 
Estimation strategy 
Following Oslo  manual  guidelines  for  collecting  and  interpreting innovation data ([4]), in 
our article a firm’s innovation activities are measured by its introduction of new products, 
adoption of new production process or modified an existing product within  the  last  three  
years.3 As a result, in our study, several types of firm innovation activity are considered: (i) 
product innovation (whether a firm produces a new good or not), (ii) process innovation 
(whether a firm adopts a new production process), (iii) product improvement (whether a firm 
improves an existing product). To  estimate  the  impact  of  corruption  on  innovation  at  the  
firm  level, the binary nature of our dependent variables renders the OLS method inappropriate. 
We thus follow  prior  literature ( [44], [47] & [48]) and model innovation using a logit 
specification. Our initial empirical model is given by 
INNOij = β0 + β1 + β2Corrij + XijβX + βθθij + εij 
where INNOij is a dummy variable indicating the innovation activity of the i-th firm at time j, 
Xij is a vector of observable factors that affect innovation of the firm, θij is an unobservable 
factor and εij is a classical random error term. In the model above, corruption, Corrij, is the 
variable of our interest and β2 captures the impact of petty corruption (bribery) on innovation. 
                                                        
3 The questionnaire contains three important items asking about a firm’s innovation activities during the 
last three years: (i) Has the firm introduced new product groups (ii) Has  the firm introduced new 
production process; and (iii) Has the firm made any improvements of existing products. 
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It has been pointed out in previous studies since the pioneering work of Fisman  &  Svensson 
[18] that corruption behavior in general and bribe payment in particular may be endogenous to 
firm performance, rendering the estimated parameter β2 to be biased. There are a number of 
reasons why corruption and firm performance are potentially endogeneous. First, corrupt 
bureaucrats could observe firms performance across time and develop their own assessment of 
the ability to pay of each firm. Corrupt bureaucrats would demand/extort bribes in accordance 
with the perceived capacity of firm to pay, which depends on profits brought about by product 
innovation, process innovation and product improvement. Thus, more  innovative  firms are 
more likely to  experience  bribes  given  their  higher  perceived  ability  to  pay. On the one 
hand, many business elements could have an effect on both corruption and firm productivity 
(as well as firm innovation capacity). In some circumstances, there exists a potential reverse 
causality between corruption and firm performance. For example, in a business environment 
where long administrative delays and slow-moving queues for public services are common, a 
firm that needs to have a license to develop their products or to access a preferential market 
could be willing to pay a larger amount in corruption than other firms. Our previous discussion 
suggests that there are several unobservable factors that could affect both firm innovation 
capacity and corruption, leading to a biased estimate of Corrij.  
To  correct  for  this  endogeneity  bias, we use the sector-location average approach 
proposed by Fisman  &  Svensson [18]. In particular, they propose that the corruption faced by 
a typical firm operating in the i-th industry at the j-th location (Corrij)  consists of two 
components:  
 
Corrij =corrij  + corrj 
where corrij refers to idiosyncratic element and corrj is average amount of bribe common to all 
firms in the i-th industry at the j-th location. The  underlying  assumption is that sector-province 
average bribing rates are uncorrelated with the firm innovative performance. For Vietnam, we 
use sector-province average as our instrument. Using the instrumental variable method, our 
model becomes:  
INNOij = β0 + β1 + β2corrIVi + Xijβx + βθθij + εij 
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where  corrIVi  is the fitted value from the first-stage regression where corruption is regressed 
on location-province bribe average and other control variables. 
Data and variables 
All necessary data is drawn from the Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing 
Enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam from 2005 to 2011. The survey has been jointly conducted by 
tCIEM and DANIDA in 10 provinces of Vietnam since 2005 biennially. It provides 
information of about 2,500 firms in 12 industries in each surveyed year. A list of industries and 
provinces included in our study is provided in Appendix 1. One advantage of using data from 
the Vietnamese SMEs Survey is that it contains information about all aspects of business 
activities such as firm history, production characteristics, investments, assets, liabilities, credit, 
networks of enterprise and entrepreneurs, economic constraints and potential, etc. It is thus a 
fruitful source for studying the performance of Vietnamese SMEs.  
The information of firm corruption is derived from the SMEs survey and constructed as a 
dummy variable that describes whether or not firms pay for informal fees. Although surveyed 
firms are asked about the amount of bribes they pay, they tend to under-report such payments. 
Using a dummy variable is thus considered as more reliable. Summary statistics of all variables 
are reported in Appendix 2.  
 
Findings and discussions 
Endogeneity 
To control for endogeneity problem, we employ an instrument for corruption using the standard 
two stage instrumental approach outlined above. In the first stage, the dependent variable, an 
indicator taking value of one if a firm report that it pays informal payment and zero otherwise 
is modelled as a function of the average industry-location bribery rate and other control 
variables. We estimate this model as a linear probability model and the estimated results are 
presented in Table 1. Essentially, the model can be seen as a model of the determinants of 
bribing behavior at the firm level. The results are qualitatively similar to those of Rand & Tarp 
[46]. Our variable of interest at the first stage is the average bribe in i-sector of the j-province. 
The estimated result indicates that there is a strong correlation between firm level bribe and the 
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sector-location average bribery rate, which implies that the sector-location average is not a 
weak instrument. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of the dependent variable as 
an instrument for the firm level bribery. 
We also perform several statistical tests checking the validity of our instruments. Following 
Wooldridge [49], we cannot run the over-identification tests since the model is only exactly 
identified with one endogenous variable and one instrument. The testing results are 
summarized in Table 2. First, the p-values for the  Anderson's canonical correlation and 
CraggDonaldWald tests confirm the adequate explanatory power of our instruments. 
Second, the CraggDonald F-statistics tests reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument. 
Finally, while the WuHausman test statistic suggests that we cannot use our instruments to 
predict the impact of corruption on process and product innovation, the DurbinWuHausman 
test only confirms the invalidity of our instrument in the case of process innovation. By 
contrast, the instrumental variables estimators should be employed in case of product 
improvement innovation, new innovation and general innovation.  
Empirical results 
The empirical results are summarized in Table 3.  We estimate both simple logit model and 
random effect logit model for each of the three types of innovation. Breusch & Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test rejects the pool regression model for product improvement and 
process innovation while pool regression is appropriate for new product innovation. Our 
analysis suggests that capital is important for innovation but its impacts depend on the type of 
innovation activities involved. For marginal innovation like product improvement, capital does 
not seem to play any important role. This is interesting as it implies that Vietnamese SMEs can 
still innovate and improve its competitiveness in this aspect without the burden of capital 
investment. Capital has a negative and significant impact on product innovation while its 
impact on process innovation is positive and significant. Usually, for SMEs in developing 
countries like Vietnam, investment in new production process and technology may require 
intensive investment in capital but not necessarily for new product innovation as SMEs would 
be more likely to imitate ‘new product’, (new to the firm but not necessarity new to the market) 
rather than develop totally new product. Human capital variables as capture by training policy 
and the percentage of professional workers in total workforce have positive and significant 
impact on all types of innovation. Our results also provide evidence to the importance of size 
for innovation. Firm’s engagement in internationalization (exporting) helps in product 
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improvement and new product innovation, but not statistically significant in process 
innovation.   
Across all our models, corruption in the form of bribery is found to have a greasing effect 
on firm’s innovation activities. The estimated marginal effects are positive and statistically 
significant. The impact of corruption is strongest for process innovation. Our finding here is 
consistent with previous studies that corruption in the form of bribery greases the wheel, even 
after controlling for potential endogeneity. In the context of Vietnam, where institutions are 
not strong enough to fight corruption, such results are not unexpected. For firms, it is a sensible 
strategy to circumvent burdensome and lengthy administrative procedures. Indeed, in 
Vietnamese language, bribery is literally called ‘facilitation money’ or ‘greasing money’. As 
such, the estimated positive impact of corruption on innovation may not come as a surprise. It 
should be noted however that our results should not be interpreted as to ‘support’ or reinforce 
corruption. Rather, it highlights an important point that in an over-regulated business 
environment such as Vietnam, it may be in the interest of firms to grease the state machinery.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Using panel data of Vietnamese Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises from 
2005 to 2011, we have examined the impact of corruption on firm innovation in Vietnam and 
obtained a positive and statistically significant relationship between the two. Our analysis 
confirms the greasing effect of corruption on a firm’s decision to innovate in several 
dimensions such as overall innovation, product improvement innovation and new innovation.    
To the best of our knowledge, our study provides the very first evidence for the impact of 
corruption on firm innovation in Vietnam. While our study is preliminary and rather limited in 
scope, it nevertheless makes a useful contribution to the literature in general and the recent 
wave of corruption studies in Vietnam in particular. Further studies are necessary to examine 
the long-run impact of corruption on firm innovation. In the meantime, the results of our study 
suggest that in the fight against corruption in Vietnam it is critically important to highlight the 
true costs of corruption in the long run, as pointed out in other studies reported in this special 
issue. 
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Table 1: Determinants of Bribery – First-stage equation (OLS) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bribery/ Informal Payment 
 
Average Bribe in i-sector j-province  0.946*** 
 (0.029) 
  
Log of Capital 0.170*** 
 (0.043) 
  
Training of workers 0.054*** 
 (0.015) 
  
Percentage of professional staff 0.294*** 
 (0.078) 
  
Owner’s Higher Education 0.007 
 (0.014) 
  
Exports 0.005 
 (0.022) 
  
Log of Firm Size 0.067*** 
 (0.007) 
  
Constant -0.403*** 
 (0.062) 
Sector dummies Yes 
Province dummies Yes 
N 6197 
R2 0.240 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2: Endogeneity Test   
 Improving 
product 
New 
product 
New 
process 
Anderson canon. corr. (Under-identification 
test)  
889.41*** 889.41*** 889.41*** 
CraggDonald N*CDEV Wald statistic 
(Under-identification test) 
1038.45*** 1038.45*** 1038.45*** 
CraggDonald Wald F-statistic (Weak 
identification test) 
1033.76*** 1033.76*** 1033.76*** 
WuHausman F test 2.56 95.99*** 14.95*** 
DurbinWuHausman chi-square test 2.57 94.96*** 14.99*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: The result of tests from ivregress in Stata 
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Table 3. Marginal effects of independent variables on innovation using logit 
method and random-effect logit method 
 
 (Logit) (RE) (Logit) (RE) (Logit) (RE)    
 Improving 
product 
Improving 
product 
New 
product 
New 
product 
New 
process 
New 
process 
   
Bribery 
(instrumented)   
0.100*** 0.533*** 0.283*** 2.322*** 0.130*** 0.880***    
 (0.034) (0.161) (0.027) (0.213) (0.029) (0.188)    
          
Log of capital  0.002 -0.052 -
0.235*** 
-
1.931*** 
0.090** 0.500*    
 (0.047) (0.231) (0.034) (0.285) (0.040) (0.277)    
          
Training of workers 0.036** 0.169** 0.051*** 0.421*** 0.075*** 0.497***    
 (0.017) (0.079) (0.011) (0.089) (0.013) (0.084)    
          
Percentage of 
professional 
workers 
0.190** 0.883** 0.136** 1.118** 0.355*** 2.366***    
 (0.090) (0.416) (0.056) (0.465) (0.066) (0.442)    
          
Owner Higher 
Education 
0.020 0.086 -0.009 -0.074 0.005 0.032    
 (0.015) (0.073) (0.011) (0.088) (0.012) (0.081)    
          
Export 0.058** 0.287** 0.041*** 0.336*** 0.019 0.143    
 (0.025) (0.122) (0.015) (0.124) (0.018) (0.121)    
          
Log of Firm size 0.066*** 0.316*** 0.021*** 0.173*** 0.056*** 0.374***    
 (0.009) (0.042) (0.006) (0.050) (0.007) (0.047)    
          
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
N 6197 6197 6197 6197 6197 6197    
pseudo R2 0.0691  0.0852  0.0939     
Breusch&Pagan 
Lagrangian 
multiplier test 
 37.65***  0.04  27.01***    
 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 1. List of industries and provinces under study 
No. Sector No Provinces 
1 food product 1 Hanoi 
2 beverages 2 Phu Tho 
3 textiles 3 Ha Tay 
4 apparel and leather products 4 Hai Phong 
5 wood products 5 Nghe An 
6 paper products 6 Quang Nam 
7 printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
7 Khanh Hoa 
8 petroleum products, chemical, 
pharmaceutical and plastics 
8 Lam Dong 
9 non-metallic mineral products 9 Ho Chi Minh City 
10 basic metal products 10 Long An 
11 electronic products, equipment, 
machinery, transport equipment 
  
12 furniture and others   
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Appendix 2. Description and summary statistics of key variables 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
2005 2007 2009 2011 All dataset 
No. of obs. 
1582 
No. of obs. 
1491 
No. of obs. 
1662 
No. of obs. 
1474 
No. of obs. 
6209  
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
New product 
1 if firm introduces new 
product(s); 0 otherwise 
0.481 0.500 0.0617 0.241 0.0367 0.188 0.0421 0.201 0.157 0.364 
Product 
improvement 
1 if firm makes major 
improvements of existing 
product(s); 0 otherwise 
0.665 0.472 0.510 0.500 0.480 0.500 0.415 0.493 0.519 0.500 
New process 
1 if firm introduces new production 
process; 0 otherwise 
0.378 0.485 0.216 0.412 0.187 0.390 0.147 0.354 0.233 0.423 
Informal payment 
(bribery)  
1 if firm bribes; 0 otherwise 0.568 0.496 0.392 0.488 0.452 0.498 0.463 0.499 0.469 0.499 
Training of worker 
1 if firm normally trains its 
workers; 0 otherwise 
0.233 0.423 0.300 0.458 0.144 0.351 0.131 0.337 0.201 0.401 
Percentage of 
professional 
worker 
Ratio of professional workers to 
employees 
0.0597 0.0915 0.0474 0.0755 0.0504 0.0768 0.0402 0.0712 0.0496 0.0796 
Owner Higher 
Education 
1 if respondent has at least a 
university degree; 0 otherwise  
0.313 0.464 0.292 0.455 0.292 0.455 0.278 0.448 0.294 0.456 
Export 1 if firm is an exporter; 0 otherwise 0.0784 0.269 0.0711 0.257 0.0650 0.247 0.0421 0.201 0.0644 0.246 
Log of firm size Log of number of employees 2.524 1.127 2.457 1.130 2.376 1.060 2.126 1.048 2.374 1.102 
Average Bribe in 
i-sector j-
province 
Mean of bribe by sector and 
province 
0.568 0.208 0.392 0.179 0.452 0.243 0.463 0.207 0.469 0.221 
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